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413

28 October 1970

SUBJECT: Individuals Witting of Coup Attempt and Degree of Knowledge

23 SEP

[REDACTED] recently bluntly asked [REDACTED] how much it would cost to get him to move. [REDACTED] intrigued but volunteered that possible offer high post by Allende might prove more alluring.

25 SEP

[REDACTED] was left in no doubt that we strongly favor military solution, with or without Frei.

25 SEP

COS stated to [REDACTED] that it may be possible to bring pressure on Frei from outside of Chile which might permit Frei to contrive a face saving exit. COS promised [REDACTED] to raise this matter in Washington.

27 SEP

[REDACTED]

Approved for Release  
July 2000

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27 SEP

3 OCT

[REDACTED] has been pressing [REDACTED] for help and [REDACTED] has so far demurred on grounds he not anxious get involved and does not know right people. [REDACTED] will now exchange his tune slightly and advise [REDACTED] who he will see [REDACTED] Oct, that he turned over [REDACTED] contact instructions to a businessman (unidentified) who allegedly has the right connections. Following this [REDACTED] will approach [REDACTED] with story that businessman suggested they had common interests. [REDACTED] will deny knowing [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] will deny knowing [REDACTED]

3 OCT

Station has gained some new insight into Viaux camp. Access comes from [REDACTED] through [REDACTED] who re-contacted Station. [REDACTED] involved with Viaux [REDACTED] Viaux may be against any CIA contact and his views toward Americans in general not clear.

5 OCT

[REDACTED] told [REDACTED] about the 2 October meeting of Min Def with Generals and Admirals - [REDACTED] and briefed [REDACTED] on what transpired. [REDACTED] mentioned he in direct contact with Viaux and still maintains that military will not do anything prior 24 Oct.

5 OCT

[REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] on 5 Oct. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that US unhappy over [REDACTED]

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Allende situation. Did not want him to be President. USG prepared to help in any way it can, to eliminate this threat. [REDACTED] explained that if military junta took over, US could help in many ways: financially, with food, agricultural loans, etc. Asked [REDACTED] to contact him if [REDACTED] had a winning plan. [REDACTED] claimed to have small organization and hopeful he can convince enough people with troops to move when the plan is right. Claimed contacts with AR, Navy, and [REDACTED]

6 OCT

[REDACTED] briefed [REDACTED] on 6 Oct along same lines as he briefed [REDACTED] above. [REDACTED] voiced appreciation and promised to be in touch.

7 OCT

COS briefed [REDACTED] on 7 Oct. Latter promised attempt to contact Gen. Valenzuela and [REDACTED] prior his departure for a meeting with [REDACTED] will ask aforementioned to dissuade Viaux, without promising Viaux USG support for any later move.

7 OCT

[REDACTED] met [REDACTED] on 7 Oct. [REDACTED] claimed be in close contact with Viaux in plotting coup. [REDACTED] made no specific requests of [REDACTED] other than the one about 4,000 machine guns. [REDACTED] made no promises or commitments.

8 OCT

[REDACTED] contacted the [REDACTED] on 8 Oct. He said the officers at the school had been working with a high ranking member of the government in trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate Gen. Schneider to either replace him or send him out of the country. They had even studied plans to kidnap him. Asked [REDACTED] if he could arrange to have Schneider invited to the US. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Asked if the US would be able to help them with several hundred small automatic weapons if they needed them in a very short period of time.

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8 OCT

[REDACTED] has on various occasions made clear to his military contacts that if they do not move now, there may be no next time. He has said this to Gen. Valenzuela; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised by COS on [REDACTED] Oct. Spanish copy of [REDACTED] passed to [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] Oct. He enthusiastic and will pass out as many copies as possible on a personal basis to his military contacts.

9 OCT

COS on [REDACTED] Oct briefed [REDACTED] on USG position. COS told them USG favors military solution and willing to support it in any manner short of outright military intervention. Stated that USG position known to [REDACTED] certain key military, all of whom know they can count on USG support for military solution now that political expedients have been exhausted. In answer to question whether USG position had only been imparted to top level of armed forces, COS said we can see no reason for withholding it from lower echelon command levels, especially regimental commanders. COS told [REDACTED] we had tried to create chaotic economic conditions. As regards acts of terror, we preferred not to become involved. Summed up USG position by emphasizing that it behooves Chileans themselves to create climate which armed forces may find conducive toward execution of golpe. Also told them that our program to reconstitute Chile's political center had been cold-shouldered by USG which strongly preferred action now and at whatever cost.

9 OCT

COS met with General [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] Oct. [REDACTED] is working closely with Generals Valenzuela (Army), [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. COS and [REDACTED] jointly analyzed available means to remove Gen. Schneider as CINC Army. For [REDACTED] benefit, COS reiterated USG position as one of unreservedly supporting a military coup. Said USG, short of armed intervention, prepared to do anything needed to get armed forces moving. [REDACTED] promised to pass message on to those closest to him.

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10 OCT

Meeting with [REDACTED] and Viaux arranged night [REDACTED] Oct through [REDACTED] Viaux requested air drop to prove [REDACTED] bona fides [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] made no commitments.

13 OCT

[REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] and was given moderate treatment in contrast to full treatment for [REDACTED] the superior of [REDACTED] explained that he not as close to [REDACTED] and went as far as he thought possible.

14 OCT

[REDACTED] had long conversation with [REDACTED] on Oct. Gave him the "party line". He said if they weren't old friends, he would have [REDACTED] thrown out since he did not feel that golpe was the way to settle the problems.

14 OCT

[REDACTED] held meeting [REDACTED] Oct. [REDACTED] briefed [REDACTED] on Viaux group. He asked for \$250,000 in lieu of written insurance policies for officers participating in coup and made strong plea for a minimum of six gas grenades and four gas masks.

14 OCT

COS met with [REDACTED] Told him USG, in event of civil disorder, is prepared to promptly deliver support and material that might be required.

15 OCT

COS briefed [REDACTED] along lines [REDACTED] asking him to advise [REDACTED] who acting for [REDACTED] Told him we prepared to honor any request by [REDACTED] submitted to [REDACTED] provided [REDACTED] makes procedural and other provisions to enable USG to deliver routinely.

15 OCT

COS worked out contingency plan whereby it may be possible to obtain arms from Air to arm Viaux group. Briefed [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] talks. [REDACTED] would play principal role in obtaining arms on lend lease basis.

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15 OCT

[redacted] told COS that [redacted] likely to obey Gen. Valenzuela's instructions. COS urged [redacted] to establish contact with [redacted] who anxious to move but isolated and without guidance. COS suggested to [redacted] he get in touch with [redacted]. Assured [redacted] that USG would promptly transact with military junta.

16 OCT

[redacted] met with [redacted] on [redacted] Oct. [redacted] told [redacted] that after last meeting with [redacted] he had established numerous (unidentified) contacts with active duty personnel and Viaux personnel. Station authorized expenditure of [redacted] to be paid by [redacted] to [redacted].

16 OCT

[redacted] learned from [redacted] that [redacted] attempted to persuade Gen. Schneider to change his viewpoint and make use of the army's last chance to prevent Allende's election.

19 OCT

[redacted] met with [redacted] retired [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] admitted to being an American intelligence service rep and found [redacted] anxious for such a contact. He seemed sincere in wanting to help and appears dedicated to removing Allende from power. He claimed to be in direct touch with Viaux.

19 OCT

[redacted] met with [redacted] on [redacted] Oct, then they met with [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] turned over 2 packages containing tear gas and gas masks to [redacted].

20 OCT

[redacted] was sent to [redacted] on [redacted] Oct by [redacted] to tell [redacted] why 19 Oct abduction attempt of Schneider aborted. [redacted] works for civilian group attached to Valenzuela. [redacted] asked [redacted] to arrange entry [redacted].

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(tourist) and transportation [REDACTED] to  
[REDACTED] If things should go awry. [REDACTED] promised help and  
station endorsed commitment.

[REDACTED]  
24 OCT

Young Chilean officer type (unidentified) met with  
COS [REDACTED] on behalf his group and asked for support  
(Viaux rep).

[REDACTED]  
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